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Date: 02-16-2024
Case Style:
Case Number: Nos. 22-50047 22-50133
Judge: John B. Owens
Court: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Plaintiff's Attorney: he United States Attorney’s Office for San Francisco
Katherine K. Windsor
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
Affirming Philip James Layfield’s convictions for wire
fraud, mail fraud, and various tax offenses, the panel rejected
Layfield’s argument that that the twenty-one days it took the
U.S. Marshals Service to transport him from the District of
New Jersey (where agents arrested him) to the Central
District of California (CDCA) (where the grand jury indicted
him) should have triggered a Speedy Trial Act violation.
Layfield argued that, properly accounting for the
transportation delay, the government did not bring him to
trial within the seventy-day limit set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(c)(1).
Section 3161(c)(1) provides that the seventy-day clock
is triggered by the public filing of the indictment or the first
appearance before a judge of the court in which the charge
is pending, whichever date last occurs.
Layfield’s first appearance before a judge in the CDCA,
which occurred fourteen days after the public filing of his
indictment, triggered the seventy-day clock. The panel held
that a plain reading of § 3161(c)(1) dictates that the twentyone-day delay between Layfield’s detention in New Jersey
and his first appearance before a judge in the CDCA was
immaterial to the Speedy Trial Act analysis.
The panel rejected Layfield’s argument that because he
was detained, a different provision becomes
* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD 3
relevant. Section 3161(h)(1)(F) provides that, in calculating
the seventy days, a “delay resulting from transportation of
any defendant from another district . . . in excess of ten days
. . . shall be presumed to be unreasonable.” The panel
explained that this provision applies to prisoners travelling
between jurisdictions for court proceedings once the
seventy-day clock has started—not to a pre-indictment or
pre-appearance transfer.
The panel addressed Layfield’s other challenges to some
of his convictions in a concurrently filed memorandum
disposition.
COUNSEL
Katherine K. Windsor (argued), Law Office of Katherine
Kimball Windsor, Pasadena, California, for DefendantAppellant.
Mark Aveis (argued), Ian V. Yanniello, and Carolyn S.
Small, Assistant United States Attorneys; Bram M. Alden,
Assistant United States Attorney, Criminal Appeals Section
Chief; E. Martin Estrada, United States Attorney; United
States Attorney’s Office, Central District of California, Los
Angeles, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
4 UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD
OPINION
OWENS, Circuit Judge:
Philip James Layfield appeals from his convictions for
wire fraud, mail fraud, and various tax offenses. He argues
that the twenty-one days it took the U.S. Marshals Service to
transport him from the District of New Jersey (where agents
arrested him) to the Central District of California (where the
grand jury indicted him) should have triggered a Speedy
Trial Act violation and requires this court to overturn all of
his convictions. Consistent with our own precedent and that
of the First and Second Circuits, we reject his challenge and
affirm.1
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Crime and Court Appearances
To make a long story short, Layfield was a crooked
plaintiff’s lawyer and certified public accountant with
operations in Los Angeles and elsewhere. He routinely (and
illegally) used client settlements to cover his personal
expenses as well as his firm’s operating expenses to the tune
of millions of dollars commingled and stolen, and eventually
moved to Costa Rica—at which point his client trust account
was down to $134.
Speedy Trial Act cases often turn on specific dates, so
the key events are listed in bullet form below for ease of the
reader.
1 Layfield also individually challenges some of his wire fraud and tax
convictions. We address those claims in a concurrently filed
memorandum disposition, in which we also affirm.
UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD 5
• February 23, 2018: A complaint in the Central District
of California (CDCA) charged Layfield with one count
of mail fraud for defrauding a client and misusing the
client’s settlement funds.
• February 24, 2018: Agents arrested Layfield on the Los
Angeles arrest warrant at the Newark International
Airport while he was boarding a flight to Costa Rica.
• February 26, 2018: Layfield made his first appearance
in the District of New Jersey, and the magistrate judge
continued his bail hearing.
• March 2, 2018: The magistrate judge denied bail and
ordered Layfield removed to the CDCA.
• March 9, 2018: A CDCA grand jury returned an
indictment against Layfield.2
• March 23, 2018: Layfield made his first appearance
before a judge in the CDCA.
B. The District Court Rejected Layfield’s Speedy
Trial Act Argument
Before the district court Layfield contended that the
transportation delay between his detention in the District of
New Jersey and his initial appearance in the CDCA should
have counted towards the seventy-day limit of the Speedy
Trial Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (providing that a trial
“shall commence within seventy days from” certain
specified dates). Layfield argued that, properly accounting
for that transportation delay, the government did not bring
him to trial within the seventy-day limit and, therefore,
2 In November 2018, a grand jury returned a twenty-eight-count
superseding indictment.
6 UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD
dismissal of the indictment was required. Ruling from the
bench, the district court relied on cases cited by the
government—United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456 (9th
Cir. 1994), and United States v. Munoz-Amado, 182 F.3d 57
(1st Cir. 1999), among others. The district court explained
that there are “no cases that say that the remedy for this
violation is to shove that time into the 70 days.” Layfield’s
argument, moreover, ignored the “universal
understanding . . . of when the 70 days began to run,” which
“is supported by Ninth Circuit law,” holding that the
triggering date is the date of the defendant’s initial
appearance in the charging district.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review and Jurisdiction
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review a district court’s interpretation of the Speedy Trial
Act de novo. United States v. Orozco-Barron, 72 F.4th 945,
954 (9th Cir. 2023).
B. There Was No Speedy Trial Act Violation
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.,
provides:
In any case in which a plea of not guilty
is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in
an information or indictment with the
commission of an offense shall commence
within seventy days from the filing date (and
making public) of the information or
indictment, or from the date the defendant
has appeared before a judicial officer of the
UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD 7
court in which such charge is pending,
whichever date last occurs.
§ 3161(c)(1). In calculating that seventy-day period, the
Speedy Trial Act excludes certain “periods of delay” listed
in § 3161(h). “If a defendant is not brought to trial within
the time limit required by section 3161(c) as extended by
section 3161(h),” then the indictment must be dismissed. Id.
§ 3162(a)(2).
Under the clear language of § 3161(c)(1), only two
events could trigger Layfield’s seventy-day speedy trial
clock: (1) the March 9, 2018 public filing of the indictment
or (2) his March 23, 2018 first appearance before a judge in
the CDCA. And because his CDCA appearance was the
latter date, it triggered the seventy-day clock. This plain
reading of § 3161(c)(1) dictates that the twenty-one-day
delay between his detention in New Jersey and his first
appearance in the CDCA was immaterial to the Speedy Trial
Act analysis.
On multiple occasions, the Ninth Circuit has confirmed
that this straightforward interpretation of § 3161(c)(1) is
correct. For example, in Palomba, the defendant argued that
his initial appearance in the CDCA should have triggered the
seventy-day period under the Speedy Trial Act, even though
he faced charges in the Northern District of California. 31
F.3d at 1462. We rejected that argument, as it “overlooks
the fact that the 70-day period commences only on the date
when the defendant is brought before a ‘judicial officer of
the court in which the matter is pending.’” Id. (quoting
§ 3161(c)); see also United States v. Wilson, 720 F.2d 608,
609 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting identical argument as
“difficult to square with the language of Section
3161(c)(1)”).
8 UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD
Layfield does not fight the clear holdings of Palomba
and Wilson. Instead, he contends that those cases featured
defendants out on bond, and not detained like he was after
his initial New Jersey appearance. Because he was detained,
the argument goes, a different provision becomes relevant—
§ 3161(h)(1)(F), which provides that, in calculating the
seventy days, a “delay resulting from transportation of any
defendant from another district . . . in excess of ten days . . .
shall be presumed to be unreasonable.”3 And because the
delay between his detention in New Jersey and his first
appearance in the CDCA was twenty-one days—exceeding
the ten days referenced above—presumably eleven of those
days should count against the seventy-day period.4
This is not a new argument, nor is it a winning one. For
example, in United States v. Barnes, 159 F.3d 4, 10 (1st Cir.
1998), the First Circuit rejected an identical contention: “The
pre-indictment or pre-appearance transfer of a defendant is
not explicitly listed as one of the only two triggering events
in section 3161(c)(1), and we decline to read into that
provision what was not expressly included by Congress.
Accordingly, . . . [the delay in transfer] does not start the 70-
day speedy trial clock.” See also Munoz-Amado, 182 F.3d
at 60 (applying Barnes to a defendant held in custody during
transport to the charging district); United States v. Lynch,
726 F.3d 346, 353 (2nd Cir. 2013) (rejecting the view that
“the limitation on the exclusion of travel time of a defendant
3 Prior to 2008, § 3161(h)(1)(F) was numbered as (h)(1)(H). See Judicial
Administration and Technical Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-406, § 13, 122 Stat. 4291, 4294.
4 In United States v. Greene, 783 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986), we
appear to have faced this very issue—the interaction between
§ 3161(c)(1) and (h)(1)(F) [then (H)]—but we ultimately did not need to
resolve it.
UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD 9
in § 3161(h)(1)(F) applies to the seventy-day period of
§ 3161(c)(1)”); cf. United States v. Wickham, 30 F.3d 1252,
1254-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (adhering to the statute’s “plain
meaning” in rejecting the argument that § 3161(i)
“replace[s] section 3161(c)(1) when a defendant withdraws
a guilty plea”).
According to Layfield, this interpretation effectively
reads § 3161(h)(1)(F) out of the criminal code. Not so. That
subsection readily applies when a prisoner, after
§ 3161(c)(1) is triggered, is transferred between districts for
separate trial proceedings. For example, the defendant may
be subject to detainers lodged by other districts where
charges are also pending against them. The first ten days of
that travel are deemed reasonable. Days exceeding those ten
are not. See Barnes, 159 F.3d at 10 (describing
§ 3161(h)(1)(F) [then (H)] as “a tolling provision, not one
that sets forth the events that trigger the start of the 70-day
period”). Courts apply this provision to prisoners travelling
between different jurisdictions for court proceedings once
the seventy-day clock has started—not to defendants in
Layfield’s procedural posture. See, e.g., United States v.
Nash, 946 F.2d 679, 680 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying section
(h)(1)(F) [then (H)] to transportation between state
institution and federal custody); United States v. Collins, 90
F.3d 1420, 1427 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying section (h)(1)(F)
[then (H)] to travel to and from state court proceedings);
United States v. Robertson, 810 F.2d 254, 259-60 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (applying section (h)(1)(F) [then (H)] to travel from
Wisconsin to the District of Columbia for trial and back).
That section (h)(1)(F) does not apply to Layfield does not
render it meaningless to others.
Layfield cites one out-of-circuit district court case—
United States v. Thompson, No. 6:06-CR-228-ORL-18KRS,
10 UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD
2007 WL 1222573, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2007)—to
buttress his argument. The judge in that case, apparently
frustrated that the government made no effort to explain a
three-month delay in transporting the defendant, ruled that
the speedy trial clock began with the order of removal. Id.
The court neither cited nor distinguished any authority but
reasoned that “[t]o hold otherwise would render the relevant
tolling provision, § 3161(h)(1)([F]), largely useless in
situations such as this one, where the Order of Removal . . .
was either ignored or forgotten about.” Id. at *2. Thompson
holds limited, if any, value: no court has ever relied on it,
and, by contrast, Layfield’s order of removal was not
ignored.
Layfield also argues that the prevailing reading of
§ 3161(c)(1) means that a defendant could spend months or
even years awaiting transport to the charging district without
any avenue of relief. Again, not so. The Supreme Court
outlined the procedure for challenging pretrial delay more
than fifty years ago in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530
(1972) (explaining that speedy trial cases require a balancing
test applied “on an ad hoc basis”). And while the facts of
this case do not merit such relief, the more egregious
hypothetical scenarios that Layfield outlines might.
Outcome:
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: